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VI.—*The Original Recension of the De Corona.*

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Just what relation the speech of an Athenian orator delivered in court, in answer to a counter-plea, holds to the same speech as subsequently revised and published, is a question that can never be settled as to details. But as regards the more general features, such as consistency of argument, evenness of finish in all parts, unity of plan, direct reference to points made by the first speaker,—in all these matters it would seem that the internal evidence gained from a careful comparison of two rival speeches would be sufficient to determine, with some degree of accuracy, not only the relation of two such speeches to each other, but also of each speech in its revised form to the same speech as originally planned and delivered.

An examination, for example, of the speech of Demosthenes vs. Timocrates shows verbal repetitions, contradictions, and less careful finish in the second half. These facts led Benseler to suppose that this oration is a patchwork made up of the speech of Demosthenes vs. Androtion, of that of Euctemon vs. Timocrates, and of a speech of Demosthenes vs. Timocrates. Schaefer regards the speech as a combination of two drafts or sketches by Demosthenes, an earlier and a later; the earlier was directed, he thinks, against both Androtion and Timocrates; but, since Androtion and his associates paid the prize-money while the action was pending, the orator prepared the second draft to meet the changed situation. This is substantially the opinion, also, of Blass. That in the prooemium the payment of the money should be denied, in the statement of the case (cf. § 11–16) be granted, then again denied in the second part of the speech (cf. 121, 131), not to mention the cases of hiatus and violations of the Demosthenic law of *εἰσρημία* to be found in the second half of the oration, is sufficient evidence that this speech cannot originally have been cast in a single mold.

This oration against Timocrates affords at once both an illustration of Kirchhoff's theory of the original recension of the *de Corona*, and, by way of contrast, as we shall attempt to show, a reason for doubting the soundness of that theory.

Kirchhoff's theory of the origin of the *de Corona* in its present form, is contained in the *Abhandlungen der Königlich-lichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1875, and is substantially as follows: It is well known that the trial of Ctesiphon was, for some reason, delayed for several years. Demosthenes, according to Kirchhoff's theory, wrote out a plea soon after the bringing of the indictment, in 336 or 335 B. C. This plea could have been directed only against the formal writ of complaint, for beyond this nothing could be definitely known of the attack of Aeschines. The *de Corona* in its present form plainly divides itself into four parts: first, § 1-8; second, § 9-53; third, § 53-121; fourth, § 122-324. The third part is that which contains the reply to the specific charges of the indictment.

It is this part (53-121), plus 3, 4, and 8 of the prooemium, which constitutes the *original* plea.

But when the trial came off, some six years later, the situation was changed. Ctesiphon and Demosthenes then agreed to divide the material of the defence, Ctesiphon taking the legal points and Demosthenes the political issues. Accordingly, Demosthenes, after careful preparation, but in extemporized language, replies to his antagonist's attack upon his political career, and makes no use of the original plea drawn up six years before. After his case was won, Demosthenes concluded to publish his speech.

In preparing his oration for publication, it was the purpose of Demosthenes to incorporate with the speech actually delivered by him at the trial, the original plea on the legal points, so as to present the entire defence in a complete form. But in remodeling the old plea he must, of course, notice the statements of his opponent, and, by interpolated passages, meet the points he had not anticipated. In proof of this recasting and interpolating, Kirchhoff cites § 73-79 and § 95-101. In § 75—Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν Δέγε—Kirchhoff

discovers an interpolation out of all harmony with the context; A. Mommsen, however, takes this, it seems with good reason, as a passage inserted by the author of the spurious documents immediately following.

But Demosthenes soon became convinced that this attempt to recast the old plea, so as to make it seem an organic part of the speech spoken at the trial, could not succeed, and the project was abandoned. Thereupon he contented himself with reducing to writing the speech actually delivered by him, reproducing, as closely as possible, the language and the arguments employed. Thus arose the *second* or *younger* speech, which is preserved in § 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10–52, 122–324. It was the intention of Demosthenes to publish only this *younger* speech and to keep the *older* in retirement. But circumstances unknown to us prevented this intention from being realized. The unknown editor of the *de Corona* found among the literary remains of the orator both the older plea, bearing the marks of an uncompleted recasting, and the completed transcript of the speech delivered at the trial; and, in the belief that the orator intended that both these pleas should be united, the editor took up the task of interjecting the older into the body of the younger speech, so as to form one united and complete defence. The work, though mechanical, was done with discretion. In conclusion, Kirchhoff expresses the hope, that, while many may not be inclined to adopt his theory without more proof, he has at all events succeeded in shaking the universal admiration of the *de Corona* as a faultless masterpiece of rhetorical art.

Kirchhoff starts out with the assumption that Demosthenes could not have arranged the subject matter of the *de Corona* in its present form, without possessing a minute acquaintance with the contents of the speech of his opponent. With this assumption we cannot agree, except so far as it may apply to certain direct references to the speech of Aeschines which will be noticed below. Furthermore, Kirchhoff thinks that Demosthenes had no expectation that Aeschines would charge him with being the promoter and author of the peace of Philocrates, and regards, therefore, the entire second division, § 9–53, as a

part of the later and actually delivered speech inserted in the earlier plea.

But this charge of Aeschines is only a degree more bold than that which he had made some thirteen years before, in his defence concerning the embassy. From a comparison of Aeschines, *de Falsa Legat.*, § 53–61 and 79, with *contra Ctesiphontem*, § 60–71, it appears that the difference in the attitude of Aeschines is simply this: in the latter speech he is almost silent about his own relation to the peace, and in the former he charges upon Demosthenes, in company with Philocrates, not the authorship of the peace, but bribery in its negotiation. When we take into the account the course of events after 344, it is not at all surprising that Aeschines, in his desire to charge the policy of Demosthenes with as many disastrous results as possible, and with his talent for misrepresentation, should, in 330, have modified the more general charge of copartnership with Philocrates in bribery, to the more specific charge of being the joint cause of the peace. It does not seem at all likely that Demosthenes was “completely surprised,” as Kirchhoff supposes, at the charges of his opponent in relation to the peace; and, bating a few direct allusions to the very words of Aeschines, no good reason can be shown why Demosthenes should not have treated this topic from the very first substantially as we find it. Nor can the supposed surprise of Demosthenes be inferred from the language in § 225, as Kirchhoff would have it. These words refer, if to anything definite, to the Theban alliance, but are best understood as a rhetorical remark upon the desperate means to which Aeschines resorts. Somewhat similar are *τίς οὐκ ἂν ᾤκνησε κ. τ. έ.*, § 126, and the language in § 209 where the allusion is decidedly obscure. The whole passage (§ 9–53) on the peace may be regarded as antedating the trial in origin, with the exception of the following direct allusions to the words of Aeschines: § 27–28, beginning with *ταῦτα τὰ χωρία*, § 41, § 51, 52, and possibly one or two more that are not so clearly distinguishable.

Kirchhoff passes now to examine the formal reply to the bill, which is contained in § 53–121. From the nature of the case, Demosthenes could more easily anticipate the course

of the attack upon the legal questions involved than upon the political issues to be discussed. So completely had Demosthenes anticipated in his preparation this part of the case, that he needs to stop but seven times in this part of his defence to notice the very words of his opponent. This is just what we should expect. But in discussing the relation of this part of the *de Corona* with the speech of Aeschines, Kirchhoff leaves it an open question whether the final recension of the speech of Aeschines was prior or subsequent to that of the speech of Demosthenes. Now a comparison of these two speeches justifies the belief that the reviser of the Aeschines had before him the present revision of the Demosthenes. Though not proved, it is properly inferred from a comparison of Aeschines, § 225, 226, with Demosthenes, § 243, and of Aeschines, § 189, with Demosthenes, § 319. So again from a comparison of the arguments of the two rival orators on the question of the place of proclamation, it seems reasonable to infer that Demosthenes could not have had the argument of his opponent in its *present* form before him when he made his own; for, while he might not have made a *satisfactory* defence upon this point, it does not appear probable that he would have made so little show of defence against the elaborate argument of Aeschines.

But the main support of Kirchhoff's theory lies in the relation which the passage § 53–110, in which Demosthenes treats of his public career in answer to the first count of the indictment, is made to bear to the rest of the oration. It is worthy of notice, to be sure, that Demosthenes should not, in this part of his speech, review his administration beyond the reform in the trierarchal law (Olymp. 110, 1). But is it reasonable to suppose that the orator, when he composed this part of his oration, had no intention of making any allusion to the important rôle he played in the events just prior to Chaeronea? The part Demosthenes had in withdrawing Athens from the war about Amphissa, in bringing about the alliance with Thebes, in fortifying the city after the capture of Elatea, the confidence the people continued to repose in him after the great catastrophe—all this Demosthenes had no idea of men-

tioning in vindication of his policy, if we must believe the theory of Kirchhoff. And why? Because Demosthenes says in § 110:

καίτοι τὰ μέγιστά γε τῶν πεπολιτευμένων καὶ πεπραγμένων ἑμαντῶ παραλείπω, ὑπολαμβάνων πρῶτον μὲν ἐφεξῆς τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ παρανόμου λόγους ἀποδοῦναι με δεῖν, εἴτα κἄν μηδὲν εἶπω περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτευμάτων, ὁμοίως παρ' ὑμῶν ἐκάστω τὸ συνειδὸς ὑπάρχειν μοι.

But this language is nothing more than a rhetorical artifice common enough in transitions and introduction of new topics. Compare the expression οὐδενὸς τούτων μέμνημαι, § 69, and similar turns in the seventeenth and twentieth prooemia of Demosthenes. We understand the orator to mean that he passes by these most important of his public deeds for the present (παραλείπω = I am [now] leaving out of view), without implying that he does not intend to speak of them later. To account for this silence about events subsequent to Olymp. 110, 1, Kirchhoff supposes that Demosthenes, at the time of the composition of his original plea, judged it to be politically inopportune to discuss the affairs connected with Chaeronea when they were still so fresh in memory. But supposing the trial had occurred when the action was first brought, is there not a moral certainty that the connection of Demosthenes with these very events would have formed a prominent part of the attack, and would have required a correspondingly vigorous defence?

In confirmation of his theory, Kirchhoff cites those passages in this division of the oration (§ 53–121) which are direct answers to the points of Aeschines, and claims that they are recognizable as later insertions and additions, since they can be detached from the context without breaking the connection, and in some instances seem to interrupt the course of the narrative or argument. Kirchhoff mentions § 70, 73–79 as far as καὶ τούτοις ἡναντιούμην, 82, 85, and 95–101 as clearly of later origin than the body of this part of the oration.

It is not with Kirchhoff's view of these passages that we find fault, but with his argument; for it involves the position that in what he holds to be the real speech of Demosthenes—§ 10–52 and 121–324—the direct allusions to the words of Aeschines

are not thus easily separable and do not break the connection, on the ground that they are not later insertions in the body of a speech composed before the trial. It is here that Kirchhoff's theory seems to break down. If passages of a like character with those above mentioned can be found in the supposed extemporized oration, then is not only Kirchhoff's theory disproved, but the opposite claim that the entire oration has the same genesis and was composed and written altogether, either before or after the trial, is established.

To this question let us now turn. There are in the *de Corona* twenty-nine distinct references to the language of Aeschines. Of this number seven are found in the formal reply to the indictment, three in the prooemium, and the rest, nineteen, are divided between divisions *two* and *four*, i. e. five in § 9-53, and fourteen in § 122-324. This seems like a distribution of points controlled rather by a pre-arranged division of the entire subject matter, than like one resulting at the moment of the trial from the order pursued by the first speaker. The speaker who extemporizes in reply to an attack is likely to follow, to some extent at least, the order of his antagonist.

It is quite remarkable how widely Demosthenes departs, alike throughout his entire speech, from the order which his rival chose in attacking him. Numbering the allusions made by Demosthenes to the words of Aeschines in the order of succession in which they occur in the speech of Aeschines, we find the corresponding sequence in the *de Corona* to be as follows: 22, 23, 5, 9, 7, 15, 8, 3, 12, 26, 27, 10, 2, 4, 18, 29, 13, 14, 6, 17, 11, 19, 21, 16, 24, 1, 28, 25, 20. It is just this disagreement in order, as compared with the speech of the plaintiff, that we should expect to find in the speech of the defendant if the structure of his speech was fixed in advance of the trial.

The question now is, are the allusions in what Kirchhoff calls the real speech of Demosthenes any less separable from the context, and any more consistent with the connection than those in the supposed original plea. While Kirchhoff does not claim this, it is yet the necessary inference from his

argument. What Kirchhoff claims to have shown in respect to the allusions in § 54–121 to the language of Aeschines, may equally well be shown, we think, in respect to similar allusions in other parts of the *de Corona*. Without pretending to be able to point out the stitches which fasten these passages to the body of the speech, we may find traces of the seams. Take, e. g., § 126–128. A glance at this passage shows that its original structure has been disturbed for the sake of ridiculing the high-flown peroration of Aeschines. The anacoluthon occasioned by δὲ in the second line (a reading of the best authority), is possibly an incidental mark of the departure from the original form.

The addition in § 161–2, beginning with οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμμαντοῦ γνώμης, the object of which is to show the false conduct of Aeschines toward Aristophon and Euboulus (cf. Aeschines, § 25, 139), weakens the sentence whose natural close is with διετέλουν.

Examine next the passage from § 218 to § 247, inclusive. The consummation of the alliance with Thebes has just been discussed. There were two points connected with that transaction which required defence: first, the favorable terms granted to Philip; second, the results of the alliance. The passage has these peculiarities: § 227–231 is evidently a later insertion. Demosthenes turns the point of the illustration, but with reference to an entirely different matter.

The reference in § 232, παραδείγματα πλάττων κ.τ.έ., seems to have suggested the entire passage from § 232 to § 237, inclusive. It is worthy of notice that in § 241 Demosthenes repeats the enumeration of the results of his policy already named in § 230, adding only one new item, sc. καὶ τῆς σιτοπομπίας. § 244–246 is apparently called forth by the taunt of Aeschines upon the bravery of Demosthenes. The connection of § 247 with § 239 is so close that they seem to belong together. The original part of this passage (i. e. the part composed in advance of the trial) may possibly be § 218–224, 238, 239, 247.

Demosthenes had still to point to the survival, after Chaeronea, of the confidence reposed in him, as evidenced by his election to the office of grain commissioner and of public

eulogist of those who had fallen. We cannot suppose that he prepared beforehand any plan of his speech without including these two points. They are treated in § 248-290. But this passage contains also three direct allusions to the speech of Aeschines, and a comparison of the fortunes of the two rivals. The reference to the case of Cephalus (§ 251) is rather loosely joined to the context by *Ναί, φησίν*. If we take § 252-275 as a part of the original composition, *πανταχόθεν* of § 252 seems to fit in well with the closing sentence of § 250. § 276-284 seems to be one of the clearest instances of later insertion in the whole oration. The opening sentence, *καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις*, helps make the transition, but does not hide the seam. The break between § 284 and 285 is the most abrupt in the oration, and has been noticed as a rhetorical defect by many critics.

The allusions to the language of Aeschines found in the remainder of the speech are so brief and so unimportant to this discussion as not to require any notice. We need not examine Kirchhoff's analysis of the Prooemium. He has confused there, as elsewhere, the notion of a subsequent revision, in which the orator incorporates extempore passages spoken at the trial, with the idea of two distinct speeches welded together by some later hand.

The theory of Kirchhoff involves other difficulties:

(1) Demosthenes is supposed to have prepared at the outset a plea on the legal points of the indictment, but when the trial occurred to have assigned this part of the defence to Ctesiphon. But for this change of plan no reason can be found, and nowhere is there any allusion by Demosthenes to a plea made by Ctesiphon.

(2) In § 238 Demosthenes repeats the allusion to the Byzantians by Aeschines already referred to in § 95, which favors rather the supposition of Schaefer, that Aeschines omitted from his revised speech what he had said on this point, out of regard for the Rhodians, than that of Kirchhoff, who believes (apparently overlooking the second allusion in § 238) that Demosthenes misquoted Aeschines.

But on Kirchhoff's supposition that Aeschines had not

mentioned the Byzantians, the allusion in § 238 as well as in § 95 would be an instance either of erroneous anticipation or of later insertion, and would go to prove that the parts of the *de Corona* in which they occur are of contemporaneous origin.

(3) The theory of Kirchhoff forces us into this dilemma: either the unknown arranger and combiner of the two speeches succeeded remarkably well in accomplishing a task which the orator himself abandoned as impracticable, or Demosthenes did not succeed, when he put his speech in writing, in giving it that unity of structure and closeness of connection in all its parts that should characterize a production carefully composed out of material fully known and at hand. The only explanation of these instances of loose connection and abrupt insertion, is to suppose that the body of the oration was composed before the trial, and that the orator in a subsequent revision inserted these originally extemporized passages as best he could.

It may be objected that too much stress has been laid in this discussion on the supposed blemishes of structure in the last division of the oration, and that the hope expressed by Kirchhoff, that he has succeeded, at least, in shaking the universal admiration with which critics have regarded the *de Corona*, seems to be confirmed by our own demonstration. The answer to this charge is three-fold: (1) In combating the theory of Kirchhoff we have employed his own weapons, and made the most of every point. The evidence brought to sustain the theory might properly be assailed as an illustration of a kind of criticism which "strains at a gnat and swallows a camel." (2) On our theory it is to be expected that the interpolated passages should be easily separable from the context, and should sometimes show the seam by which they are, so to say, stitched into the whole. The skill with which this is done in most instances is itself worthy of admiration. (3) A comparison of the *de Corona* with other speeches of Demosthenes argues the essential unity of origin of this oration.

Take, for example, the oration of Demosthenes on the False Embassy.

In this oration critics have discovered grave faults of arrangement and composition, and have proposed bold changes and excisions. One of the latest and boldest of these critics is O. Gilbert (die Rede des Demosthenes *περὶ τῆς παραπρεσβείας*, Berlin, 1873). The latest defender of the present plan of the speech is Blass, who seconds the views of Schaefer except as regards the relation the written speech holds to the spoken. From the discrepancies between the speech as we have it and the allusions to it found in the reply of Aeschines, Blass argues that the written speech was prepared some time before the trial, and was not afterward revised so as to meet the change of situation brought about by the condemnation and flight of Philocrates; while Schaefer, on the other hand, explains these discrepancies by supposing that Demosthenes, in revising his speech, suppressed some passages and added others.

However that may be, the point that concerns us more particularly is that the most radical view of the origin and character of the *de Fals. Legat.* goes no farther than to point out displacements and later insertions in the text, and throws no doubt upon the original oneness of origin of the oration.

It would be interesting in this connection to make a minute comparison between the oration of Aeschines *de Fals. Legat.* and the *de Corona*, particularly with reference to the direct allusions which each orator makes to the words spoken by the other. From such a comparison it would appear that Aeschines pursued, in the subsequent revision of his speech, the same course that we suppose in the revision of the *de Corona*. We have space to notice only a few of the twenty direct allusions made by Aeschines to the words of Demosthenes.

In § 56 Aeschines refers to the attack of Demosthenes upon his speech before the assembly (*τῆς δὲ ὑπὸ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης*), and proceeds to show that Demosthenes falsified, referring particularly to the statement of Demosthenes, *de Fals. Legat.*, § 13-16. This statement covers two points: (1) That Aeschines spoke against the peace of Philocrates the *first* day, and in favor of it the *second* day of the Assembly; (2) that he thus changed his attitude in the presence of the envoys

sent by the Greek states to act in concert with Athens. The answer of Aeschines to (2) is contained in § 57–62; to (1), in § 63–69. The sentence in § 69, ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὴν δημηγορίαν κ.τ.έ., is plainly intended to form the connecting link between the inserted passage and the body of the speech.

An examination of Aeschines' *de Fals. Legat.*, § 144–171, warrants the belief that this entire passage is a later insertion. The beginning of this passage marks what is, perhaps, the most abrupt transition in the oration. Aeschines has been explaining how Phocis came to be ruined, "first through fortune which is the arbiter of all, then through the length of time and the ten years' war." He calls for testimony from Boeotians and Phocians to show how he had benefited their states, and then asks πῶς οὖν οὐκ κ.τ.έ., § 143. Then without any introduction, without any sentence to make the transition, excepting the words ἐτόλμησε δ' εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐγὼ τοῖς περιπίπτω, he passes to consider, in § 144–171, matters of a personal nature in response to the attacks of his opponent. The close of this passage is but little less abrupt than its beginning. In § 170 Aeschines calls up testimony to his honorable record as a soldier; § 171 forms the connecting link between these personal considerations and a review of the history of Athens.

An analysis of the passage itself, including § 144–171, shows the sutures of the different parts. In § 144–145 Aeschines tries to turn the point of the quotation of Demosthenes about φήμη. In § 146–152 he meets the charge of betraying his country into the hands of Philip. In this passage occurs the allusion to the attack of Demosthenes on Philon, no reference to whom is found in the speech of Demosthenes as handed down. § 153–159 is occupied, as far as the sentence ἀλλ' οἶμαι κ.τ.έ., with a reply to the contrast Demosthenes had drawn between the conduct of Aeschines and of Satyrus towards the Olynthian woman and the prisoners of war. What follows in § 159–161 seems intended to lead the hearer (reader) back to the main issue; but presently this is forgotten, and in § 162–163 the charge is noticed that he joined with Philip in singing paeans after the destruction of Phocis. The abruptness of the opening sentence in

§ 162, its want of connection with what precedes, is apparent at a glance. In § 164–166 Aeschines answers the charge that he so suddenly changed his attitude towards the peace. Then follows, in § 167–170, the defence of his military record, already mentioned above.

The last part of this oration, from § 172 on, seems originally to have been directly connected with the passage immediately preceding § 144–171. In § 130–138 Aeschines aims to show that through the agency of Demosthenes and his associates Athens was prevented from joining with Philip in an honorable attempt to put an end to the Phocian troubles. In § 172–178 he proceeds to show that it was in the line of ancestral precedent to make peace as well as to carry on war, and that peace had generally been productive of more good than war.

The sentence οὐ τοὺς Δημοσθένους ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἔων προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι κ. τ. έ., in § 171, is plainly intended to recall the expression in § 138, τοὺς προγόνους ἐκώλυσα τὸν δῆμον μιμεῖσθαι, and seems to have been written for the very purpose of connecting these disjointed parts.

Enough has been shown of the structure of the *de Fals. Legat.* of Aeschines to make it appear that in its present form it is to some extent—just how far may not be exactly determined—a reconstruction and recension of the one original speech delivered at the trial, and a fit parallel of the *de Corona* in its genesis and composition.

While we may never be able to show just how far this process of recasting and revising an oration for publication extended, we trust that this discussion has, at least, made apparent the wide distance that separates an oration like the *de Corona*, and the *de Fals. Legat.* of Aeschines, from a production like the *Timocratea*, which, as was shown at the outset, is confessedly not simply a revision of what was originally one speech, but a combination of two or three different pleas, characterized, in spite of the skill shown in the work of combination, by contradictions, by literal repetitions, and by unevenness of finish.